Recently, Maitra et al (Phys. Rev. A, 2017) proposed a protocol towards Device Independent Quantum Private Query (DI-QPQ) by exploiting a tilted version of local CHSH game on top of the QPQ protocol proposed by Yang et al (Quant. Inf. Process., 2014). In the present draft, we carefully tweak the existing protocols to propose a novel QPQ scheme. Our technique exploits the traditional CHSH game and hence this improved protocol guarantees device independence. Further, we provide formal security proofs and obtain an upper bound in information leakage to both dishonest client as well as dishonest server.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the very first proposal due to Chor et al [1] , Private Information Retrieval (PIR) attracts extensive attention in the domain of classical cryptography [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] . The basic idea of PIR is to store N -bits of information (x 1 , . . . , x N ) in a database X. Whenever a client wants to know some bits (i 1 , . . . , i l ) of information from the database, the entire database may be provided so that the client can extract the information according to the need. Naturally, in this trivial protocol, the database cannot learn anything about the query. However, the inefficiency lies in communicating the complete database.
Another variant of PIR is Symmetric Private Information Retrieval (SPIR) introduced by Gertner et al [7] . SPIR is more stringent than PIR as it takes into account the security of the database too. In SPIR the entire database is not provided; only the required elements queried by the client are supplied in such a manner so that the database owner cannot get any information about the queried elements. Designing a secure SPIR scheme is a difficult task. Since the client's privacy and the database security appear to be conflicting, it is elusive to design information theoretically secure SPIR scheme both in classical and in quantum domain [7, 8] . However, under the assumptions that there exist some distributed databases and those are allowed to share certain randomness, designing a secure SPIR scheme might be possible.
Private query is a more practical version of an SPIR scheme, where the client is allowed to gain more information about the database than SPIR. This primitive is weaker than SPIR but stronger than PIR. However, this type of primitive suffers from the same limitation as the PIR schemes. For example, in order to response client's query, server must process the entire database. Otherwise, the server will gain additional information regarding the indices corresponding to the client's query. Moreover, the server needs to send the encrypted version of the entire database; otherwise it would get an estimate about the number of records that match the query.
All these information retrieval protocols exploit some mathematical hardness assumptions [2, 9] . Unfortunately, in quantum domain those hardness assumptions are proved to be tractable [10] . This generates the need for designing private information retrieval protocols in quantum domain. In Quantum Private Query (QPQ), a client issues queries to a database and obtains the value of data bits corresponding to some particular indices without knowing anything else about the database, whereas the server should not gain any information about the query indices of the client. The first protocol in this domain had been proposed by Giovannetti et al [11] , followed by [12] and [13] . However, all these protocols used quantum memories and none of these are practically implementable at this point of time. For implementation purpose, Jakobi et al [14] presented an idea which was based on a Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocol [15] . This is the first QPQ protocol based on a QKD scheme. In 2012, Gao et al [16] proposed a flexible generalization of [14] . Later, Rao et al [17] suggested two more efficient modifications of classical post-processing in the protocol of Jakobi et al.
In 2013, Zhang et al [18] proposed a QPQ protocol based on counter factual QKD scheme [19] . Then, in 2014, Yang et al came up with a flexible QPQ protocol [20] which was based on B92 QKD scheme [21] . This domain is still developing, as evident from number of recent publications [22] [23] [24] . Some of these protocols exploit entangled states to generate the keys between the server (Bob) and the client (Alice). In some other protocols, a single qubit is sent to client. The qubit is prepared in certain states based on the value of the key and the client has to perform certain measurements on this encoded qubit to extract the key bit. Although these protocols differ in the process of key generation, the basic ideas are same.
The security of all these protocols is defined on the basis of the following facts.
• Server (Bob) knows the whole key which would be used for the encryption of the database.
• Client (Alice) knows a fraction of bits of the key.
• Bob does not get any information about the position of the bits which are known to Alice.
It is natural to consider that one of the legitimate parties may play the role of an adversary. Alice tries to extract more information about the raw key bits, whereas Bob tries to know the position of the bits known to Alice. Thus, such protocols can be viewed as two party mistrustful cryptographic primitive. Very recently, Maitra et al. [25] identified that the security of all the existing protocols are based on the fact that Bob relies his devices, i.e., the source which supplies the qubits and the detectors which measure the qubits. Thus, similar to the QKD protocols, trustworthiness of the devices are implicit in the security proofs of the protocols. With the aim to remove this trustful assumption over the devices, a device independent protocol has been described in [25] . The authors introduced a testing phase for the involved devices and propose a device independent version over the Yang et al [20] protocol.
A. Revisiting the existing QPQ protocols
The prime objective of any QPQ protocol is to share a key between the server and the client such that the server knows every bit of the shared key and the client knows some of the bits. To share this secret key, most of the recent QPQ protocols use either BB84 type QKD scheme or entanglement based QKD scheme (which are equivalent in certain setting). After the generation of the shared key, the server encrypts the whole database with this shared key using one time pad and sends this encrypted database to the client. As the client knows some bits of the key, she can decrypt some of the database bits corresponding to her conclusively known key bits. The step by step approaches followed by the existing QPQ protocols are described here.
1. The server (Bob) and the client (Alice) share a raw secret key between themselves which is usually much larger than the size of the database (generally k times of the database size for some k > 1).
Most of the QPQ protocols use some variants of the existing QKD schemes [15, 21, 26, 27] to generate the shared secret key between the server and the client.
2. The server (Bob) and the client (Alice) then perform post processing on the shared key. Both the parties divide their corresponding raw key into some substrings of equal length such that the total number of substrings are equal to the number of bits in the database and then perform bitwise XOR among the bits of each substring to generate each bit of the final key.
3. According to the requirement, the client (Alice) introduces a shift in the key bits and sends the corresponding information to the server (Bob).
4. Server (Bob) encrypts the whole database with the shifted key of considering one-time pad and sends the encrypted database to client (Alice).
5. Client (Alice) decrypts the encrypted database with the final shifted key at her place. As client knows some of the bits of the final key conclusively, she can recover some of her intended bits from the database.
Most of the existing protocols rely on the functionality of the devices. Lack of knowledge about the devices might cause security loop-hole. Such an attack has been discussed in [25] and hence a device independent version of QPQ protocol has been proposed. However, the protocol is not optimal in terms of sample size (for finite sample scenario) [28] .
B. Relation between QPQ and Oblivious Transfer
Oblivious Transfer (OT) is a well studied cryptographic primitive which was first introduced informally by Wiesner [29] and then subsequently formalized as 1 out of 2 OT in [30] . In 1 out of N OT protocol, the server Bob knows N values and would like to let the user Alice choose any one of them in such a way so that she does not learn more than one value and Bob remains oblivious to the value Alice chooses. Private query protocols also offer similar functionality like 1 out of N OT protocol. Extensive efforts have been given for analysing the security of OT protocols in classical domain [31, 32] . In quantum domain, Salvail et al. [33] provided lower bounds on the amount of information leakage to a dishonest party in any OT protocol. Jain et al. [34] discussed about the tradeoff between the number of bits of information each player gets about the other parties' input in 1-out-of-N OT. Those protocols provide information theoretic security. Chailloux et al. [35] derived non trivial lower bound for the cheating probabilities in OT exploiting lower bound for quantum bit commitment. However, all those protocols assume certain characterization of the devices and hence do not guarantee device independent security.
C. Our Contribution
In the current report, we address the problem of performing private search on a classical database such that the user can retrieve an item from the database without revealing which item was retrieved and at the same time, the data privacy of the database is also preserved i.e., the user can not learn any extra information about the database other than the query. As, it is a distrustful cryptographic protocol, the data privacy and user security contradicts each other. In this scheme, we try to maintain data privacy as well as user security so that no significant information is leaked to any of the parties and if anyone tries to violate the security then this party will be caught by the other party. Our main contribution in this paper is threefold which we enumerate below:
1. Removing trustworthiness from the devices (source as well as measurement devices) by robust CHSH testing. Maitra et al. [25] proposed device independent QPQ scheme using a tilted version of the actual CHSH game. However, the tilted version of CHSH game might not guarantee the device independence in its truest sense with non-maximally entangled states. In this proposal, we remove the tilted CHSH test (as in [25] ) and use the traditional CHSH game for self testing the EPR pairs.
2. We replace the usual projective measurement at Alice's side with optimal POVM measurement so that Alice can obtain maximum conclusive raw key bits. In this paper, we also show that our proposed scheme provides maximum number of conclusive raw key bits for Alice.
3. Contrary to all the existing QPQ protocols, in the present effort, we provide a general security analysis and provide an upper bound on the cheating probabilities and a lower bound on the amount of information leakage in terms of entropy for both the parties (server as well as the client).
D. Notations and Definitions
Let us first list a few notations.
• I k : the Identity matrix of dimension k.
• A(A * ): honest (dishonest) client Alice.
• B(B * ): honest (dishonest) server Bob.
• A i (A * i ): the i-th subsystem corresponding to honest (dishonest) Alice.
• B i (B * i ): the i-th subsystem corresponding to honest (dishonest) Bob.
• |φ BiAi : the i-th copy of the shared state where 1st qubit corresponds to Bob and 2nd qubit corresponds to Alice.
• ρ Ai : the reduced density matrix at Alice's side for i-th shared state.
• X: the N -bit database which corresponds to server Bob.
• R(R A ): the raw key corresponding to Bob (Alice) of size kN bits for some integer k > 1.
• F (F A ): the final key corresponding to Bob (Alice) of size N bits.
• I l : the index set of the elements which are quarried by the client Alice.
• a i : the classical bit announced by Bob for i-th shared state.
• A(B): measurement outcome at Alice's (Bob's) side.
Next we present a few definitions that will be required for further discussions.
• Trace Distance: The trace distance allows us to compare two probability distributions {p i } and {q i } over the same index set which can be defined as
• In quantum paradigm, the trace distance is a measure of closeness of two quantum states ρ and σ. The trace norm of an operator M is defined as,
The trace distance between quantum states ρ and σ is given by,
• Fidelity: Like trace distance, fidelity is an alternative measure of closeness. In terms of fidelity, the similarity between the two probability distributions {p i } and {q i } can be defined as,
• The fidelity of two quantum states ρ and σ is defined as
• In case of pure states, the fidelity is a squared overlap of the states |ψ and |φ , i.e.,
where ρ = |ψ ψ| and σ = |φ φ| are corresponding density matrix representation of the pure states |ψ and |φ respectively.
• The two measures of closeness of quantum states, trace distance and fidelity, are related by the following inequality [37] ,
• Trace distance has a relation with the distinguishability of two quantum states. Suppose, one referee prepares two quantum states ρ and σ for another party (say Alice) to distinguish. The referee prepares each of the states with probability 1 2 . Let p correct denotes the optimal guessing probability for Alice and it is related to trace distance by the following expression,
It implies that trace distance is linearly dependent to the maximum success probability in distinguishing two quantum states ρ and σ. For further details one may refer to [37] .
• Conditional Minimum Entropy: Let ρ = ρ AB be the density matrix representation of a bipartite quantum state. Then the conditional minimum entropy of subsystem A conditioned on subsystem B is defined by ( [38] )
where I A denotes the identity matrix of the dimension of system A and the infimum ranges over all normalized density operators σ B on subsystem B and also for any two density operators T, T we define,
• Let ρ XB be a bipartite quantum state where the X subsystem is classical. For the given state ρ XB if p guess (X|B) ρ XB denotes the maximum probability of guessing X given the subsystem B, then from [38] we have,
In quantum private query none of the parties trust each other. So, each of the parties have different security goals. The security requirement of the server (Bob) is termed as Data Privacy and the security requirement for the client (Alice) is termed as User privacy. Formally these terms are defined below.
Definition 1. Data Privacy:
The amount of information dishonest Alice (A * ) gets about the N -bit database X is limited by λ (0 ≤ λ ≤ 1), which is negligible in N , i.e.,
Definition 2. User Privacy: Let the honest user or Alice wants to have access to x i1 , . . . , x i l bits of the N -bit database X. Let I l = {i 1 , . . . , i l } denotes the corresponding indices set. Then the maximum information extracted by a dishonest Bob (B * ) about the set I l is limited by δ (0 ≤ δ ≤ 1), which is negligible in l, i.e.,
II. PROPOSAL FOR AN IMPROVED AND FORMAL DI-QPQ
The quantum private query protocols are composed of several phases. Depending on the functionality, we have divided the entire protocol into four phases. The first phase is termed as "entanglement distribution phase". In this phase a third party (need not to be a trusted one and may collude with the dishonest party) distributes several copies of EPR-pairs between the server (Bob) and the client (Alice). The next phase is called "entanglement verification phase". In this phase the server and the client play CHSH game. If their success probability of winning the game lies within a predefined threshold, then they can conclude that the states, distributed by the third party, are EPR pairs. Third phase is termed as "key establishment phase". In this phase the server generates a secret key and shares some portion of it with the client. In the last phase, i.e., in "private query phase", server encrypts the database using the key generated in the last phase and send it to the client. Client then decrypts some portion of the database using the information about the key she received in the previous phase. Now we describe the step by step procedures of the protocol.
• Entanglement Distribution Phase:
1. A third party distributes K copies of two qubit entangled states between Alice and Bob which are supposed to be of the form
Here Alice (Bob) receives A (B) subsystem of |φ BA .
• Entanglement Verification Phase: Entanglement verification phase is sub-divided into two parts; one for Alice and one for Bob. Below we describe the phases one by one. • Key Establishment Phase:
1. After the entanglement verification phase, Alice and Bob share rest (1 − γ)K EPR pairs among themselves. Let us denote that set as Γ Key 2. Bob randomly chooses (1 − γ)K bits,
-If R i = 0, Bob measures the B-subsystem of the i-th copy of |φ BA in {|0 , |1 } basis. -Otherwise Bob measures the B-subsystem of the i-th copy of |φ BA in {|0 , |1 } basis, where |0 = cos θ|0 + sin θ|1 , |1 = sin θ|0 − cos θ|1 . 4. After the measurement, Bob does the following: 
For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Alice and Bob does the following--If vi(ṽi) = 0, Bob performs a measurement in {|0 , |1 } basis on his i-th qubit. If the measurement outcome is |0 Bob outputs bi = 0, otherwise he outputs bi = 1.
-If vi(ṽi) = 1, Bob performs a measurement in {|+ , |− } basis. If the measurement outcome is |+ Bob outputs bi = 0, otherwise he outputs bi = 1.
-If ui(ũi) = 0, Alice performs a measurement in {cos 
|1
Alice outputs ci = 0, otherwise she outputs ci = 1.
-Bob and Alice announce their input output pairs publicly (Whenever Alice behaves as a referee, Bob first declares his input output pairs and then Alice declares her input output pairs. Whenever Bob behaves as a referee, they declare in the opposite order i.e., Alice first declares her input output pairs and then Bob declares his input output pairs). Based on the values of ui(ũi), vi(ṽi), bi, ci, Alice and Bob computes Zi in the following manner.
Otherwise. 
-Alice and Bob computes
Similarly, in this case also, if Alice gets D 0 (D 1 ) then she concludes that Bob measures in {|0 , |1 }({|0 , |1 }) basis and the original raw key bit is 0(1). Whenever Alice gets D 2 , her measurement outcome remains inconclusive.
• DI Testing for POVM Elements:
1. From this shared (1−γ)K states, Alice chooses randomly γK 2 states and sends the information about these chosen singlets to Bob.
-Bob announces the values of those qubits.
Alice then checks whether she gets expected results for these states (i.e., if Bob announces |0 , the expected outcomes at the end of Alice should be either D 0 or D 2 but not D 1 and so on).
states and sends the information about these chosen singlets to Bob.
-For these chosen states, Alice computes the number of positions for which she gets conclusive outcomes and let this number be P . 4. Alice and Bob use the raw key bits obtained from these kN many states for next phase.
• Private Query Phase:
1. Alice and Bob now share the raw key string of length kN where Bob knows every bit value and Alice knows partially.
2. Bob randomly announces a permutation which reorder the kN bit string and then Alice announces a shift s 0 randomly chosen from {0, 1, · · · , kN − 1}. After the announcement, they both shift the shared raw key by s 0 and then apply the permutation.
3. Bob cuts the raw key into N substrings of length k and tells each bit position to Alice. The bits of every substring are added bitwise by Alice and Bob to form the final key of length N . At the end, if Alice does not know any bit of the final key F (which actually corresponds to Bob), then the protocol has to be executed again.
Alice and Bob performs error correction on
Alice's final key using the method proposed in [23] . After that Alice estimates the error rate of every final key. If all the error rates are less than some predefined threshold value , they proceed further to the next step. Otherwise, they abort the protocol.
5. Suppose that Alice knows the i-th bit F i of Bob's final key F and wants to know the jth bit m j of the database, then she announces the number s = i−j. Consequently Bob shifts the final key F by s bits and use it to encrypt the database using one time pad. As, m j will be encrypted by F i , Alice can correctly recover the intended bit after receiving the encrypted database.
6. If Alice wants to know the information about l database bits, she has to repeat the whole procedure for l many times to retrieve the intended bits.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE PROTOCOL
In this section we discuss the security related issues of our proposed protocol.
A. Correctness of the Protocol
First we prove the correctness of the protocol. Proof. After the key establishment phase and the DI testing phase for POVM elements, Bob and Alice share kN raw key bits. These raw key bits were generated from kN copies of maximally entangled states of the form
where, |0 = cos θ |0 + sin θ |1 and |1 = sin θ |0 − cos θ |1 . Here θ may vary from 0 to π 2 . The generation of such kN raw key bits can be redefined as follows.
Bob prepares a random bit stream R = R 1 . . . R kN of length kN . If R i = 0, Bob measures his qubits in {|0 , |1 } basis. Whereas, if R i = 1, Bob measures his particle in {|0 , |1 } basis. After each measurement Bob announces a bit a i ∈ {0, 1}. If he gets |0 or |0 , he announces a i = 0. If he gets |1 or |1 , he announces a i = 1. Now, Alice's job is to guess the value of each R i .
Thus, whenever Bob declares a i = 0, Alice can understand that Bob gets either |0 or |0 and the shared qubit of her side also collapses to |0 or |0 respectively. However, to obtain the value of the raw key bit, Alice has to distinguish these two states conclusively. As, |0 and |0 are non-orthogonal states (when θ = π 2 ), Alice cannot distinguish these two states with certainty.
According to the strategy mentioned in the protocol, whenever Bob declares a i = 0, Alice chooses the POVM {D 0 , D 1 , D 2 }. After measurement, if Alice receives the outcome D 0 , she concludes that Bob's measurement outcome was |0 . In such case, Alice concludes that R i = 0. If Alice receives the outcome D 1 , she concludes that Bob's measurement outcome was |0 . In such a case, Alice concludes that R i = 1. However, if the measurement outcome is D 2 , then Alice remains inconclusive about the value of the raw key bit. Alice follows the similar methodology for a i = 1. Now, we calculate the success probability of Alice to guess R correctly. Let us assume that Pr(D j | |φ i ) denotes the corresponding success probability of getting the result D j when the given state is |φ i i.e.,
We will now calculate the corresponding success probabilities of getting different results for the states |0 and |0 .
For |0 , the success probabilities will be
Similarly, for the state |0 , the success probabilities will be
Similarly, whenever Bob declares a i = 1, Alice chooses the POVM {D 0 , D 1 , D 2 }. In a similar way, we can calculate the success probability here. We formalize all the conditional probabilities in the following table.
Cond. Probability of Alice
According to the protocol, if a i = 0 and Alice gets D 0 (D 1 ), she outputs R Ai = 0(1). When a i = 1 and she gets D 0 (D 1 ), she outputs R Ai = 0(1). Thus, the success probability of Alice to guess the i-th raw key bit R i of Bob can be written as
So, the overall success probability of guessing the key bits by Alice according to the proposed key generation protocol becomes (1−cos θ). This implies that at the end of key establishment phase Alice could conclusively guess (1 − cos θ)kN number of key bits on an average.
We now prove the security of our proposed protocol considering the noise parameter η → 0.
B. Security of private query phase
In the key establishment phase, Bob chooses kN many raw key bits randomly and Alice can know some of this raw key bits. Then in private query phase , both Alice and Bob cut their raw keys in some particular positions to prepare N substrings of length k and then perform bitwise XOR among the bits of each substring to get the N bit final key F . Here, R i (1 ≤ i ≤ kN ) denotes the i-th raw key of Bob and F i (1 ≤ i ≤ N ) denotes the i-th final key of Bob. Relation between R i and F i can be written as,
Where ⊕ denotes addition modulo 2.
It will be more clearer by a toy example. Consider N = 10 and k = 2. Let us assume that the raw key at Bob's side is, 01 10 01 00 10 01 01 11 00 11 and after the key establishment phase, the raw key at Alice's side is, i.e., Alice knows the values of 2nd, 5th, 11th, 12th, 14th, 17th and 20th key bits of the original raw key (? stands for inconclusive key bit). Now, after the modulo operation on the raw key, the final key at Bob's side will be, Thus, the number of known key bits by Alice is reduced from 7 to 1. The significance of such modulo operation is to enhance the security of the protocol. This is similar to the privacy amplification in a QKD protocol.
C. Database security against dishonest Alice
In this section we give upper bound on the amount of raw key bits dishonest Alice can guess during the key establishment phase. Theorem 2. In the key establishment phase , dishonest Alice can inconclusively retrieve at most Proof. After the testing phase of key establishment, dishonest Alice (A * ) and honest Bob (B) share kN raw key bits generated from the kN copies of EPR pairs. The ith copy of the state is given by |φ
, where i-th subsystem of Alice and Bob is denoted by A * i and B i respectively. At Alice's side the reduced density matrix is of the form
At
Step 3, Bob measures each of his part of the state |φ 
This implies ρ A
As there is no communication between Alice and Bob before Step 4 of the key establishment phase so, due to non-signalling principle we can claim that Alice can guess Bob's measurement outcome with probability at most 1 2 . At Step 4 of the key establishment phase, Alice receives the information a i from Bob. Let ρ A * i |ai denotes the state of Alice given the value of a i . According to the protocol,
This implies that for a fixed a i = 0 (a i = 1) if Alice wants to guess the value of R i then she needs to distinguish the state from the ensemble of states {(
In other words, whenever Bob measures his qubit and announces the bit a i = 0, Alice knows that Bob gets either |0 or |0 . Similarly, when Bob announces the bit a i = 1, Alice knows that Bob gets either |1 or |1 . So, to retrieve the value of the original raw key bit, Alice needs to distinguish between the states |0 and |0 or between the states |1 or |1 . As it is known that non orthogonal quantum states cannot be distinguished perfectly, Alice cannot guess the value of each raw key bit with certainty. This distinguishing probability has a nice relationship with the trace distance between the states in the ensemble [37] . According to this relation we have,
This implies that Alice can successfully retrieve the value of R i with probability at most 1 2 + 1 2 sin θ. Now there are total kN many bits in the raw key. So, the maximum number of bits Alice can know inconclusively will be almost equals to As, each bit of the final key F is generated by XORing k number of raw key bits, the guessing probability of dishonest Alice for each of the final key bit F i will be upper bounded by the value (
k . From the operational interpretation of min-entropy [38] , we can rewrite the guessing
As, all the raw key bits R i are chosen both randomly and independently, each of the final key bits will also be random. So, from the additive property of the conditional min-entropy we have,
According to the protocol, the size of the final key is equal to the size of the database and the database is encrypted by performing bitwise XOR with the final key.
So, the correct guessing of a final key bit implies the correct guessing of the corresponding database bit. It implies,
For the proposed QPQ protocol, according to the definition 1, the database contains N number of data bits. From Lemma 1 we can derive the following upper bound on the value of λ. Corollary 1. In the proposed QPQ protocol, for dishonest Alice and honest Bob, Alice can guess λ fraction of the key bits, where
In theorem 2 we show that Alice can guess only
kN fraction of the key bits. However, one can get tighter upper bound if we restrict Alice's guessing strategy to only conclusive ones. In theorem 3 we give an upper bound on how many key bits a dishonest Alice can guess conclusively.
Theorem 3. In the key establishment phase of the protocol, for honest Bob and dishonest Alice, Alice can conclusively retrieve at most (1 − cos θ) kN many bits of the original raw key where kN is the size of the entire raw key.
Proof. From the previous discussion, it is clear that the dishonest Alice tries to distinguish either between |0 and |0 or between |1 and |1 with as much confidence as possible. For this purpose Alice will go for unambiguous state discrimination for two density matrices. For a i = 0, Alice will choose such a USD which distinguish ρ = |0 0| or ρ = |0 0 | with optimal confidence. Similarly, for a i = 1, Alice will choose an optimal USD which can distinguish ρ = |1 1| or ρ = |1 1 | with maximum confidence. In this regard, she chooses optimal POVM {D 0 , D 1 , D 2 } when Bob announces a i = 0 and {D 0 , D 1 , D 2 } when Bob announces a i = 1 (Please see the Appendix for the derivation of optimal POVM elements).
If the outcome is D 0 , Alice concludes that the state was |0 . If it is D 1 , the state was |0 . The guessing will be inconclusive only when the measurement outcome will be D 2 .
Similarly, whenever the outcome is D 0 , Alice conclusively knows that the state was |1 . If it is D 1 , Alice concludes that the state was |1 . She can not tell anything if the measurement outcome will be D 2 .
From Theorem 1, we get that the success probability of Alice to guess a key bit conclusively is 1 − cos θ. There are total kN bits in the raw key. Hence, the total number of raw key bits that Alice can conclusively guess will be (1 − cos θ)kN .
The comparative study between maximum inconclusive success probability and maximum conclusive success probability is shown in figure 1 . From the figure, it is clear that the maximum inconclusive success probability outperforms maximum conclusive success probability for small values of θ.
FIG. 1:
Comparison between maximum inconclusive and conclusive success probability of the client D. User security against dishonest Bob Theorem 4. In the proposed QPQ protocol, for each index i, a dishonest Bob (B * ) can successfully guess whether i ∈ I l with probability at most (1 − cos θ) k , i.e,
where, k is the number of raw key bits used to generate a final key bit.
Proof. At the key establishment phase, dishonest Bob (B * ) and honest Alice (A) share kN raw key bits generated from kN copies of EPR pairs. The i-th copy of the state is given by |φ
Ai , where i-th subsystem of Bob and Alice is denoted by B * i and A i respectively. At Alice's side the reduced density matrix is of the form
At step 4 of key establishment phase, Alice receives the information of a i from Bob. In the next step, Alice performs a particular POVM measurement. Then, based on the post measurement state and the value of a i , Alice concludes the value of her raw key bit.
Let R Ai denotes the bit that Alice concludes after observing a i . Then we can write,
.
Let for any dishonest Bob B * , Pr[a i = 0] = p and Pr[a i = 1] = 1 − p. This implies,
Let for all index i, Alice can get conclusive outcome with probability atmost q i.e.,
So, Alice can successfully guess each bit of the raw key with probability atmost q. As, each of the final key bit is generated from this raw key by performing bitwise XOR operation among k raw key bits, Alice's success probability of getting each of the final key bit is upper bounded by q k . If F Ai denotes the i-th bit of the final key that Alice gets after the XOR operation, then we can write,
denotes dishonest Bob's guessing probability of F Ai =⊥. As Alice gets atmost N q k positions of the actual final key F conclusively and in the key establishment phase, there is no communication from Alice's side, so dishonest Bob can guess whether F Ai =⊥ or not with probability atmost q k , i.e,
Now, Alice can retrieve a database bit correctly when Alice gets a conclusive key bit. Let Alice gets ith key bit of the final key F after all the post processing of raw key bits. In this case, Alice can retrieve ith element of the database, i.e., i ∈ I l . This can be written as,
Let Pr guess [i ∈ I|F Ai =⊥] ρ B * i denotes dishonest Bob's guessing probability of i ∈ I l . Now, if Bob knows that Alice gets conclusive result for her i-th key bit then Bob can guess Alice's corresponding query index with certainty because the shift amount is known publicly. This implies,
This implies,
From theorem 3 we have q ≤ (1 − cos θ). This completes the proof.
Lemma 2. In the private query phase, if Alice wants to know l number of database bits and if I l denotes the corresponding query index set then H min (I l |B * ) ≥ lk log( Proof. In the key establishment phase, if honest Alice can guess each of the raw key bit with probability atmost (1 − cos θ) and uses k number of raw key bits to generate a final key bit F Ai then it is clear that
From theorem 4, we can see that if i denotes an index of the database then
where B * denotes dishonest Bob's subsystem corresponding to i-th EPR pair.
From the operational interpretation of min-entropy [38] , we can rewrite the guessing probability of dishonest Bob as Pr guess [i ∈ I l |B * ] = 2 −Hmin[i∈I l |B * ] . This implies, for all the l query indexes 1 ≤ i ≤ l, the conditional min-entropy of a query index bit i is H min [i ∈ I l |B * ] ≥ (− log(1 − cos θ) k ). As, all the query index bits are chosen independently, from the additive property of the conditional min-entropy we have,
For the proposed QPQ protocol, according to the definition 2, Alice wants to know the value of l data bits from the database. From Lemma 2 we can derive the following upper bound on the value of δ. Corollary 2. In the proposed QPQ protocol, for dishonest Bob and honest Alice, Bob can guess δ fraction of Alice's query index set, where
In order to increase Alice's conclusiveness about the raw key as well as the final key bits, dishonest Bob can perform middle state attack which was proposed in the security analysis of [14] and [16] . In the middle state attack, instead of measuring his qubit in {|0 , |1 } or {|0 , |1 } basis, dishonest Bob will measure his qubit in a middle state basis {|0 , |1 } irrespective of the value of raw key bits where,
According to this strategy, after measuring his qubit in {|0 , |1 } basis, if Bob gets |0 , he will announce 1 and 0 otherwise. Whenever Bob gets |0 , Alice's qubit will also collapse to |0 and when Bob gets |1 , Alice's qubit will collapse to |1 . When Bob announces 1 (i.e., actually he gets |0 ), honest Alice will choose the POVM {D 0 , D 1 , D 2 } for measurement and conclude about the raw key bit based on her measurement outcome. Similarly, whenever Bob announces 0 (i.e., whenever, he gets |1 ), honest Alice will choose the POVM {D 0 , D 1 , D 2 } for measurement and conclude about the raw key bit according to her measurement outcome. It can be shown that in this case, Alice will get either D 0 or D 1 for a i = 0 and D 0 or D 1 for a i = 1. Alice will not get D 2 or D 2 in any of the cases. However, when Alice gets D 0 or D 1 for a i = 0 and D 0 or D 1 for a i = 1, it will not be known to Bob. So, half of the cases Alice's results match with Bob's encoding. In this strategy, Alice will get correct result for each raw key bits with probability 1 2 ,i.e., Pr(R Ai = R i ) = 1 2 . Therefore, the correctness condition of the protocol is violated. As a result, finally, when Alice tries to extract the elements from the database, she obtains wrong elements.
In the present draft we are interested about those attacks which preserve the correctness condition of the protocol. As middle state attack does not preserve correctness condition, we will not consider this as a valid attack model.
E. Device independent security
In the proposed protocol, the device independent (DI) testing has been done in two phases. The first DI testing is done in entanglement verification phase and the second DI testing occurs at key establishment phase. In entanglement verification phase two way CHSH game has been performed. Firstly. Alice tests whether the entangled states provided by the third party are EPR pairs by playing CHSH game. In this part Alice does not trust Bob and she plays the role of a referee. Alice chooses the classical input bits randomly on behalf of referee. They (Alice and Bob) then perform measurement according to the random bit values at the end of each party. After the measurement, they discuss the output publicly and check the fraction of inputs that satisfy the CHSH condition. From the rigidity of CHSH game [39] In first step, Alice chooses randomly a fraction of measured states and sends the information about these chosen singlets to Bob. Bob then announces the value of qubits corresponding to each of these chosen states. Alice checks whether she gets expected outcomes for all these cases, i.e., if Bob announces |0 , Alice should get either D 0 or D 2 but not D 1 and so on. If for any one of these states, Alice gets conflicting results (i.e., Bob gets |0 but Alice gets D 1 and so on), she concludes something wrong in her devices.
Conditioning on the event that the first step has been successfully passed, Alice goes for second testing. In this case, Alice again chooses randomly some fraction of states from the remaining states and sends the information about those chosen singlets to Bob. Bob declares the value of each qubit for these states. Alice computes the number of positions for which she gets conclusive outcomes. Let this number be P . If P < (1 − cos θ − η) γK 2 for the predefined noise tolerance η, then Alice concludes that her measurement device is not perfect.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Most of the quantum private query protocols have been proposed considering quantum key distribution. Thus, a significant portion of the security issues depend on the security of the underlying QKD protocol. For example, to achieve a secure QPQ protocol the legitimate parties should possess every detail of the devices used. To remove such an assumption, like a DI-QKD scheme, we have to test the devices first. In this direction Maitra et al [25] proposed tilted version of CHSH test over the QPQ protocol designed by Yang et al [20] . The authors chose tilted version of CHSH game because of the usage of non-maximally entangled states in Yang et al protocol.
In the present draft, we design a novel DI-QPQ protocol considering maximally entangled states. And hence, we can exploit the standard CHSH game to certify the devices. This improves the robustness of the protocol. Further, all the existing QPQ protocols analyzed the security issues considering certain eavesdropping strategies. However, in the present draft, we analyzed the security of our proposed protocol in the most general way. We found an upper bound in the information leakage through the protocol both to dishonest client and to dishonest server. the given state |φ i . Then According to the choice of this POVM elements, whenever the outcome is D 2 , the result will be inconclusive i.e., for those cases nothing can be concluded about the given state. So, for two different states (here |0 and |0 ), the probability of getting the outcome D 2 must be the same. Otherwise, there will be a bias in the choice of states corresponding to the inconclusive result D 2 . Thus, Pr(D 2 | |0 ) = Pr(D 2 | |0 ) which implies α = β. Our aim is to choose the value of α which will minimize the overall uncertainty. We get, Pr(m = D 2 ) = Pr(D 2 | |0 ). Pr(|0 ) + Pr(D 2 | |0 ). Pr(|0 )
In this protocol, for the declaration a i = 0, these two states occur with equal probability. So, Pr(|0 ) = Pr(|0 ) = For a particular state, the value of θ is constant. So, to minimize the overall uncertainty, we have to maximize the value of α such that the POVM elements satisfy the necessary conditions. As each POVM element should be positive semidefinite, the eigenvalues of D 0 , D 1 , D 2 must be greater than or equals to 0. From the characteristic equation, i.e., det(D i − λ i+1 I) = 0, i = {0, 1, 2}, we can find the eigenvalues of the operators. Let λ 1 , λ 2 and λ 3 denotes the eigenvalues of D 0 , D 1 and D 2 respectively. Solving the characteristic equation for each POVM element, we get λ 1 = 0 or α and λ 2 = 0 or α and λ 3 = (1 − α) + α cos θ or (1 − α) − α cos θ. As λ 3 must be greater than or equals to 0, we get a bound on the value of α by setting the above expressions for λ 3 ≥ 0.
From the first relation i.e., (1 − α) + α cos θ ≥ 0, we get α ≤ 
